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PARTITION.
Partition proceedings can hardly be classed among topics
for enlivening discussion, text books say little about them and.
case books less; they lack the dramatic elements present in crime
and tort. Yet every lawyer welcomes a brief in a partition
suit; for, today, the difficulties are few and the fees compara-
tively generous. There are local statutes and rules which must
be followed with implicit attention; the pace is leisurely and
sedate, as befits the disposal of real property; and if, when
all is done, the co-owners appear shocked at their diminished
shares, there is at least a little morsel for everyone, which is
more than can be said of other forms of litigation. Yet there
was a time when the path of co-owners who would dissolve
their union was beset with obstacles almost insurmountable; the
gradual removal of which constitutes a chapter in legal history
not wholly devoid of interest.
Necessarily the development of the law of partition is de-
pendent upon social and economic conditions. Before a system
for the division and allotment of property can be adopted the
principle of division must be admitted. In one place and period
it may require the united efforts of a large family group to
wring a hard living from the land. Another group may have
land, slaves and cattle in sufficient abundance to permit of sub-
division. The great variety of customs relating to inheritance
to be found throughout Europe, shows that the human race,
however unconsciously, was then as always, engaged in experi-
ments in living. One point not always brought out with suffi-
cient clearness is that the recognition of the principle of equality
of interest on the part of the heirs or a group of heirs in the
ancestral property does not necessarily lead to its division. The
claims of a chief, suspicion .of the stranger, conditions of agri-
culture, lack of capital represented by oxen and plows, one or
all may tend to check the distribution of the family estate. As
Sir Henry S. Maine has pointed out, the equal division of the
property among the children of the deceased, frequently with a
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preference for males over females, is the practice most usual
at the period when the joint family is disintegrating and society
is assuming its modern form. Such was the case under Hellenic,
Roman and Jewish law.' So also, among the early Teutonic
tribes. 2 With the development of the Feudal system came pri-
mogeniture, the exclusive succession of the eldest son to estates
held by military tenure, the starting point of a new policy of
impartible inheritance which has survived the Feudal system
itself in Great Britain and parts of Continental Europe through
the medium of family settlements, and trust entails, (fideicom-.
inissa, substitutions, majorats).
At Roman law co-owners could enforce a division of the
common property by the action communi dk'idundo.3 Co-heirs
had a special action of their own familiae erciscundae 4 for the
division of the inheritance, given by the'law of the Twelve
Tables. Both actions were admirably adapted to their purpose.
The judge in making a division was to be guided by considera-
tions of what was most beneficial to all concerned, or what
the parties preferred.5 If land admitted of easy division, allot-
ments were to be adjudged to the respective co-proprietors; and
if one received too large a share he was required to compensate
the others. If the subject of partition could not be advanta-
geously divided, then the whole was allotted to one who com-
pensated the others.6 In the time of the Empire the property
was awarded to the highest bidder, and even a stranger might
be admitted to bid at the request of a co-owner who was unwill-
ing or unable to bid for himself. 7 These principles which ap-
'Maine's Ancient Law 221; Maine's Early History of Institutions 799;
Robinson on Gavelkind (5 Ed.) x3.
'Tacitus, Germania, c. 2o; Huebner's History of Germanic Private
Law (Cont. Leg. Hist. Series), p. 708; .Lges William 1, 34; 2 Blackstone's
Commentaries 215.
"Digest, Lib. X, tit. 3; Institutes IV, tit. 17, Sec. S.
" Digest, Lib. X, tit. 2; Gaius, IV, Sec. 42; Institutes IV, tit. 17, Sec. 4.
'Digest, Lib. X, tit. 3, Sec. 21.
'Digest, Lib. X, tit. 2, Sec. 55.
'Law of the Emperor Alexander (A. D., 223), Code, Lib. III, tit. 37,
See.. 3.
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plied equally to real and personal property are the basis of the
modern civil law on this subject as found in the continental
code. But their reception was attended in many places by a
long struggle against feudal customs and ancient local practice.
In Great Britain the policy which from the Norman Con-
quest onward was ever directed in favor of indivisible inherit-
ance, making, as it were, the law of the noble the common law
of the realm, left little room for the operation of partition.
Pollock and Maitland call attention to the small number of cases
in the time of John and of Henry III which refer, to partible
land." According to Glanvill and Bracton the eldest son of a
knight or one holding by military tenure succeeds to all that
was his father's; while sockage land that had been divided
from of old descends to all the sons. If the decedent leaves
daughters only, then the inheritance is divided whether the
father was knight or sockman. Such co-heiresses as well as
co-heirs where division was the ancient custom were called "co-
parcefiers" or "parceners" for the very reason that the law
would compel partition among them. In their favor alone lay.
the writ de partitione facienda.10 For a time primogeniture
threatened to extend to daughters as well as to sons, indeed
some progress was made in that direction resulting in the recog-
nition of the eldest daughter as the representative of the inher-
itance in special instances; but as wardships and marriages of
heiresses were highly profitable to the feudal lord, king and
baron soon perceived they had most to gain by taking the homage
of all the daughters.1 ' As for non-military tenures, there were
'Domat's Civil Law (Strahan's Ed.) Pt. 1, 13k. 2, tit. V. 2, 12; Pt.
ri, Bk. z, tit. i, Sec. i-, ii; Brissaud's History of French Private Law
(Amer. Ed.), Secs. 48D-482; French Civil Code, Secs. 815-842; German
Civil Code, Secs. 752, 753, 2038; Erskine's Principles of the Law of Scot-
land (.21 Ed.) Bk. III. tit. 3. Sec. 18. p. 435; Civil Code of Louisiana, Secs.
1289-1381; Hache v. Ayrand. 14 La. Ann. 178 (i859); Succession of Becel,
117 a. 44 (xgo6).
'II Pollock & Maitland Hist. 27o;. Bracton's Note Book, 154, 499;
Select Civil Pleas (Seld. S.) Cases 6, 57, 61, 121.
'Glanvill, VII, 3; Bracton, f 76; Fleta, 1, 5, 3. 9, See. isi; Mirror
Bk. I, C. 3; Y. B. 2 and 3; Edw. II (Seld. S.) 76, 97; Fitzherbert Natura
Brevium 62; Littleton, Sec. 241.
*'Britton II, 29, 40.
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districts scattered throughout the country where partible descent
was and continued to be the custom, but they-gradually dimin-
ished in number. The royal courts were strongly set against cus-
toms that did not conform to the common law and the force
of fashion was also strong.
A charter of Edward I voices the feeling of the time-
"that lands and tenements, which in certain hands when undi-
vided are quite sufficient for the service of the state, and the
maintenance of many, are afterwards divided and broken up
among co-heirs into so many parts and particles that no one
portion suffices for its owner's maintenance."' 2  The county of
Kent was the stronghold of partibility, for the custom of gavel-
kind was the custom of the whole county-in the words of Lit-
tleton "every son is as great a gentleman as the eldest son is",
yet even in Kent a considerable number of estates were dis-
gavelled by acts of Parliament between Henry VII and James I
because, as Coke puts it, "by means of that custom divers ancient
and great families after a few descents came to little or noth-
ing."1 If the estate of the noble was indivisible so also was that
of the villein.14 Manorial custom usually required that one
heir succeed to the dead man's teniement, sometimes the eldest
son. sometimes the youngest where the very old custom known as
Borough English prevailed. In either case it was in the interest
of the lord of the manor that the holding of the villein remain
undivided, with a single heir answerable for the customary serv-
ices, although the brothers for whom no other employment could
be found frequently remained together on the parental plot.15
As an economic problem impartible inheritance has been the
subject of heated controversy. In England and in some of her
Robinson on Gavelkind (5th Fd.), z
'Co. Litt. 14o b; Wiseman v. Cotton, r Si. 13s (0662).
"Elton on Copyholds (2d Ed.) 128; II Pollock & Maitland Hist --82.
' Vinogradoff, Villeinage in England 246. This was once true in the
higher ranks of society. Domesday shows groups of thegns holding land
in common; holding "in parage" as the Norman's called it; one of the
pares rendering the services due the king. Maitland, Domesday Book and
beyond r45. Compare the co-heir communities of knights in Germany.
Huebner's Hist. Germ. Priv. Law. 4.
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colonies the principle has been maintained with more unanimity
than in Continental Europe,. but there is a growing sentiment
against entails and doubtless when Parliament has time to con-
sider private law, a further approximation of the rules of de-
scent of realty to those of personalty wil be the outcome. 6  In
France the rule. of equal diiision, in common use among the
peasantry before the Revolution and embodied in thie code Napo-
leon, has been ,ttacked as tending to split up estates into minute
parcels to the detriment both of agriculture and the worker,.
(Morcelleinent)j'7  The difficulty lies in decidipg where physi-
cal division must stop and superfluous members of the family
seek another Outlet for their activities, if any are to remain, on
the ancestral acre-a problem most acute where the agricultural
population is rooted to the soil and not, as in this country, always
on the move. But whatever may be the true view today,
medieval England had no doubt whatever as to the superiority
of an indivisible inheritance. In. the words of Adam Smith;
who did not favor primogeniture in his own time, "The security
of a landed estate, the protection which its owner could afford
to those who dwelt on it, depended upon its greatness. To
divide it was to ruin it and to expose every part to be oppressed
and swallowed up by the incursions of the neighbors."
18
Although the scope of the action of partition was greatly
circumscribed by the common law of inheritance there were a
sufficient. number of instances in which it could be called into
operation to build up a modest body of learning on the subject
which lies buried in the old abridgments and Coke on Littleton.
Now and again a worthy knight would have the misfortune to
die "having several daughters and no son". Lands held by
tenure of gavelkind lay scattered throughout the kingdom and
abounded in Kent. Then too, town law was tenacious of old
customs and the rule of partible inheritance was to be found
"The Need of Law Reform, Sir Alfred. Hopkinson, K. C., Edinburgh
Review, Oct., 1918.
' Economic Development of Modern Europe, Ogg. 19t; Cecil on Primo-
geniture xoo; Lawrence on Primogeniture 41.
"Wealth of Nations Bk. 3, ch. 2.
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frequently. in the custumals of ancient boroughs. 19 When thei
common law action was -brought there were two judgments.
The first, that partition be made; whereupon the sheriff with
a jury of twelve went upon the land, made a division of it and
allotted the shares or liurparts to the' heirs respectively. Upon
the sheriff's return followed the second and final judgment-
"equod partitio praedicta' firnid el stabilis in perpetuum tent-
eatur",20 a formula that still survives. Bracton gives' a fuill ac-
count of the duties of the viewers in appraising and allotting the.
land. The divisi6n" is physical. "A hall is sometimes divided'
into two or more parts, and sometimes a chamber is divided
from the hall." But a castle used for the defense of the realm is
not to be divided but to remain to the eldest born, satisfaction
being made to the juniors. In the case of indivisible heredita-
ments, Sir Edward Coke declares that the eldest shall enjoy
them, making contribution; but if the ancestor left nothing else,
then the parceners are to enjoy in turn; as in case of a piscary
"the one may have one fish and the other the second", or if a
mill, "one to have the mill for a time and the other the like
time". 2 1 If, however, the property was capable of division,
division was a matter or right no matter how inconvenient. A
sale was out of question, and so the law continued until modem
times.
Additional forms of co-ownership were evolved at common
law to which compulsory partition was not an incident. In the
case of tenancies by entireties, partition could not come in ques-
tion by reason of the unity of husband and wife in marriage
and the fact that on the death of one, the entire estate passed
to the other by force of the original gift.2 2 As early as 1302
PTorough Customs (Seld. S.) Vol. x1, p. 132; Elton, Tenures of
Kent, s4..
" Co. Litt. x6ga; Countess of Warwick v. Lord Berkley, ii Co. 40
(1596); Booth on Real Actions, 245,
I Bracton fE 75. In Y. B. 9 .Edw. III (R. S.) 12-14 a mill is divided.
Temple v. Cook. Dyer 265 (s67); Co. Litt. i65a. In modern times, on
grounds of public policy partition of a railroad has been refused, Railway
v. Railroad Co.. 38 Ohio St: 614 (883),' and of a burying ground, Brown
v. Lutheran Church, 23 Pa. 495 (1854).
2 Den v. Hardenbergh, io N. J. L. 42 (1828), s. c. 18 Amer. Dec. 371
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it is stated in a reporter's note that-"a writ de participatione
facienda does not lie between strangers as it does between
privies",2 3 and, later, Littleton tells us "joint tenants (if they
will) may make partition between them and the partition is good
enough; but they shall not be compelled to do this by Jaw". The
same was true of tenants in common . -4  Modern writers give
as the reason for this, the fact that these estates were created
by the act of the parties and any inconvenience arising out of
the co-6wnership resulted from the voluntary act of the parties.2
The logic of this reasoning,, if applicable to estates created
by deed, is hardly admissible in the ca'se of estates created by
devise. But lands were riot devisable by will, except by special
custom until 1540. It is significant that the custom of partible
descent is frequently, as in Kent, accompanied by the custom
of devising lands.26 So in London, where lands were to some
extent devisable, partition would lie at the instance of a joint
tenant or tenant in common. 27  A simpler explanation is that
when these later forms of co-ownership were developed, no writ
for their partition was to be found in the register and the age
for inventing writs had passed. Co-owners, therefore, who were
not co-parceners or whose lands were not governed by special
custom were forced to hold unitedly unless they could arrange
for the purchase of their interests or agree upon an amicable
partition, until the remedial legislation of 1539.
The statute of Henry V111 28 which conferred upon joint
tenants and tenants in common of estates of inheritance the right
note; Hoag v. Hoag, 213 Mass. so (912), s. c. A. & E. Ann. Ca. 1913 (E)
886.
"Y. B. 30-31 Edw. I (I. S.) 324.
'Littleton, Sec. 29o, See. 318; Brook's Abr. Particion, P. 35.
II Blackstone's Comm. i85; Freeman on Co-tenancy, Sec. 4.2y Story
says this reasoning is "more specious than solid." Equity Jurisp, Sec. 647.
" Robinson on Gavelkind (5th Ed.) 191; Littleton, Sec. 167.
'Bohun's Privilegia Londini, 7.1; Comyn's Dig. London (N. 3); Fitz-
herbert Natura Brevium, 62; Liber Albus (Riley) i6g.
0 3 1 Hen. VIII; c. 1. applicable to joint tenants and tenants in com-
mon of estates of inheritance. In the following year the Act of 32 Hen.
VIII, c. 32, s. L extended partition to persons holding limited estates for
lives or years.
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to a compulsory division of the common property by writ of par-
tition, is preceded by a lengthy preamble which with the circumlo-
cution of the day sets forth the purpose of the law. It would
seem that the principal complaint was of acts of waste and
spoliation on the part of co-owners for which there was no
remedy. This, however, cannot have been anything new. The
instances of such abuses of power were probably fewer than in
the disorderly period that had preceded. It is a safe inference
that the true reason that led parliament to turn aside for a mo-
ment from the more exciting work of dissolving monasteries
and "abolishing diversity of opinion on religion" 20 and enact
this fragment of private law, was the silent force of economic
pressure, resulting from a new attitude toward land. Feudalism
was in decay, commercialism in the ascendant and real property
rapidly becoming a form of investment. -Fractional shares in
estates would for all practical purposes remain unmarketable if
no means was provided by which a purchaser could dissolve an
uncongenial partnership-and protect his interests. Even so, the
relief afforded by the act was, from the modern viewpoint, or
judged by Roman -standards, far from adequate. The remedy
provided was an action unchanged since the days of Bracton,.
technical, dilatory, and frequently ineffectual, as was frankly
admitted in the act of 1696 30 intended to remedy some of the
more glaring defects in the procedure at law. But before that
time arrived the more flexible practice developed in the court
of chancery rendered the commorl law jurisdiction practically
obsolete and it was abolished in 1833.3' It should be added that
there could be no partition of copyhold lands without the lord's
consent until 1841 when power was conferred on chancery to
direct their partition.2
The origin of equitable jurisdiction in partition- is obscure.
"This was the parliament of the Six Articles, 31 Hen. VIII, c. 14.
"8 & 9 William III, C. 31.
"3 & 4 William IV, c. 27, s. 36.
"Scott v. Fawcett, i Dick, 2w (I757); Oakley v. Smith, i Eden 26Y
(1759); Horncastle v. Charlesworth, TI Simon 315 (t84o); Act 4 & 5
Vict. c. 5, Sce. 85; Copyhold Act of 1894, Sec. 87.
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Many years ago Mr. Hargrave started a rather sharp contro-
versy on this subject in a note to Coke on Littleton by referring
to the jurisdiction of chancery as "A new comptsory mode of
partition . . . trenching upon the writ of partition and wresting
from a court of common law its ancient exclusive jurisdiction over
this subject". The earliest instance of which, that. he could find,
was a case in 40 Elizabeth (1598). 3  To which Mr. Fonblanque
replied-"A practice sanctioned by a precedent of so early a
date as the 40 Elizabeth cannot reasonably be .described as a
new mode, particularly when it is considered that there are few,
if any, reports of decisioni in equity of an earlier date." 34 Mr.
Justice Story was not only opposed to Mr. Hargrave's view, but
assigned to such proceedings a date far earlier and a scope more
extended than was suggested by Mr. Fonbianque, or by Mr.
Spence who fixed the assumption of this jurisdiction in or
about the reign of Elizabeth.35 The final solution of this prob-"
lem must await a careful examination of the many thousands
of unpublished petitions in chancery from the time of Richard II
to Henry VII now in the Public Record Office in London.
The Selden Society's selection from these records contains one
case of this description during the chancellorship of John Staf-
ford, Bishop of Bath, that is, between 143z and 1443. 16  The
petitioner William Brigge alleges that he and his brother Thomas
were joint tenants of certain lands under the terms of their
father's will; that the feoffees to the uses of the will attempted
to assign part to each, but the defendant Thomas, the elder
son, had occupied the whole and petitioner could not have his
part "because ther is no particion made ther offe, for the which
particion to be made ther is non accyon atte common lawe".
The prayer is for a subpoena to, Thomas to appear in chancery
tmCo. Litt. x6ga, Hargrave's note ; Speke v. Walroud, Toth 155 (z598).
uFonblanque's Note, Treatise of Equity, Bk. 1, ch. 1, S. 3.
Story's Equity Jurisprudence, Chap. 14; Spence's Equitable Jurisdic-
tion of Court of Chancery 654.
I Select Cases in Chancery, p. i29, No. 1.36. There are supposed to be
about 3o0,00o of these petitions collected in 377 bundles, Barbour, Oxford
Univ. Studies, Vol. IV, 67. Two bundles are printed in the calendar
of proceedings in Chancery. Record Commission 1827. A third bundle and
some selections are printed by the Selden Society.
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and make partition. The result of the application is not given
and while it is possible to account for this case on the theory
of a trust, it is more reasonable to suppose that the petitioner
intended. to rely on the grounds stated in his bill-that is, the
absence of a remedy at law for the injured joint tenant. At
least, it is a bill for partition in chancery one hundred and
fifty years before the first previously reported case, tending to
confirm Mr. Justice Story's view.
From an early period, when land descended to coparceners
who held of the king in capite, a writ of livery and partition
issued out of chancery directed to the king's escheator com-
manding him to make partition and deliver seisin of the respec-
tive shares.3 7 The partition so made was enrolled in chancery,
but, unconfirmed by judgment or decree, was not conclusive
against an infant parcener and hence was open to attack by
scire facias or partition proceedings at law. This practice, in-
duced by a policy of increasing the king's tenants in capite, dis-
appeared with the abolition of tenure by knight's service and its
incidents; 38 but the fact that chancery, on its law side, was at one
time accustomed to deal with partition problems may possibly
have tended to facilitate the growth of the purely equitable juris-
diction.
In the present state of the records it would be difficult to
discover the actual grounds upon which chancery first assumed
jurisdiction in partition-it could hardly be done without an
expenditure of labor out of all proportion to the result. Inde-
pendently of those cases which before the legislation of Henry
VIII might have been put on the ground of lack of any remedy
at law, there were other cases in which the legal remedy was
inadequate and imperfect, as where the titles of the parties were
complicated, discovery or an accounting required, or compensa-
tory adjustments necessary. Mr. Spence thinks a reference to
"Fitzherbert, Natura Brevium, 256-263, Stanford, Prerogative 24-25;
Y. B. 2 Edw. III. 2o pl. 5; Y. B. z5 Edw. III. (R. S.) 9 pl. 42; Y. B.
21 Edw. III. 31.
*12 Charles II. c. 24 (x66r). See for Court of Wards and Liveries, 3
Co. Inst. 188.
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Roman models can be discerned, 39 but if the clerical chancellors
took a hint from the civil law the borrowing was slight; chattels
were ignored; the public sale not even considered; equity in this
regard proposing no innovations upon common law theories of
property. The earliest reported cases in Tothill 40 are brief
memoranda that throw little light on the subject and the same
is true of such cases as occur in the early years of the seventeenth
century. In Manaton v. Squire in 1677, on bill by a tenant in
common, it was held by Lord Nottingham, "that the chancellor
had equal power to make partition by commission as the common
law had by writ of partition; for it cannot be denied but by
statute 32 Hen. VIII a tenant in common hath a right to par-
tition; and the delays at common law many times are such, it
being a real action (if the demandant happen to bring his writ
agaiinst the persons that are not tenants, etc.) that he shall never
attain the end of it; and he said he did no more question the
jurisdiction of chancery in this case, than he did, whether a
gift to a man and his heirs were a fee simple." 4 And, if, as
Lord Hardwicke put it, the complainant's. title was equitable, a
court of equity alone could determine the application. 42  In
Agarv. Fairfax 43 it was said by Lord Eldon: "This 'court issues
a commission not under the authority of any act of Parliament,
but on account of the extreme difficulty attending the process
of partition at law; where the plaintiff must prove his title as he
* Spence, Equitable Jurisdiction 653. See also Fulbecke's Parallel, part 2,
p. 55.
. Tothill r5S. Seven cases between i586 and I64O. See also Spyer v,
Spyer, Nelson 14 (63z-32) ; Drury v. Drury. i Chan. Ren. 49 (x63o-3z).
a2 Freeman 26 (1677) S. C. 2 Chan. Ca. 237, where it is reported as
follows: "A partition between tenants in common of a great waste de-
creed tho' many reasons tending to great inconveniences, via: want of pas-
ture. shade, etc." In Carteret v. Petty, 2 Swanst. 323 note a (1675), s. c.
2 Ch. Ca. 214 Lord Nottingham refused to partition lands in Ireland. In
Earl of Kildare v. Eustace, i Vern. 419 (x686) s. c. 2 Ch. Ca. i89, it was
said in argument that "bills are common here for a partition." Mayfair P.
Co. v. Johnson (1894) i Ch. So8.
'Cartwright v. Pultney,. 2 Atk. 38o (1742). But the necesgary convey-
ances could not be ordered unless the parties able to convey the legal
title were also before the court. Miller v. Warminaton. T Tac. & W. 484
(1820).
17 Vesey 533 (io ), s. c. White & Tudor's Leading Cases in Equity.
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declares, and also the titles of the defendants; and judgment is
given for partition according to the respective titles so proved."
In chancery the practice was to direct an inquiry before a master
to determine the estates and interests of the parties, and, if it
appeared that complainant was entitled to partition, then a decree
was made appointing commissioners (usually surveyors) to
divide the estate into the specified number of shares. Upon a
return of the commission and confirmation by the court the par-
tition was completed by mutual conveyances of the allotments
under the supervision of the master, a practice that had this
advantage over proceedings at law, that the parties were furnished
with permanent muniments of title.44
If the title was doubtful or disputed equity required that it
should be first established at law; 45 but if clear, then physical
partition of the land was a matter of right and the court could
not refuse it or order a sale, although the result might be incon-
venient or even absurd. Sir Thomas Clark,. Master of the
Rolls, stating the rule in 1754 4  refers to Nevis v. Levene,
where "the plaintiff was entitled to three or four hundred acres
and the defendant to four or five only; and though the defendant
would have rather given up his part than he at the expense of a
partition yet it was decreed". The partition of the -estate called
Cold Bath Fields, which included complicated rights to ancient
conduits and water rents, bristled with difficulties; nevertheless
Lord Hardwicke made a decree.47 Excepting its power to award.
compensation for inequalities in the allotments, called owelty .
equity offered little advantage over law in its actual dealing with
"Mitford's Chancery Pleadings 14!. As to the Commissioners, see Wat-
son v. Northumberland, xi Ves. 153 (905). If one of the parties was an
infant no conveyance could be directed in his case until he came of age.
Lord Brook v. Lord Hertford 2 P. Wins. 519 (1728); Tuckfield v. Buller,
i Dick. 24o (1753).
Bishop of Ely v. Kendrick, Burnb, 322 (1732); Wilkin v. Wilkin, i
Johns. Ch. 11 (814); Phelps v. Green, 3 Johns. Ch. 302 (x818). In Bly-
man v. Brown, 2 Vern. 232 (1691), the court gave plaintiff a year in which
to try his title, and after a verdict in his favor decreed partition.
Parker v. Gerard. Arab. 2.36 (T. 75.
"Warner v. Baynes, Arab. 589 (x7so). See also, Baring v. Nash, i V. &
B. 551 (1813) : Calmady v. Calmady. 2 Ves. Jr. .68 (t795); Earl of Claren-
don v. Hornbv. T P. Wins. 46 t(1718).
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the property. In the well known case of Turner v. Morgan,
48
the bill was for the partition of a single house. Lord Eldon
granted a commission with great reluctance after trying to induce
the parties to come to an agreement. On the return of the
commission an exception was taken on the ground that the
commissioners had "allotted to the plaintiff the whole stack of
chimneys, all the fire places, the only staircase in the house and
all the conveniences in the yard". Lord Eldon overruled the
exception, saying he did not know how to make a better parti-
tion and that he was bound by authority.
Such was the extent of equitable jurisdiction in partition;
development went no further. The procedure represented an ad-
vance beyond the common law action, but was too rigid, too-
limited and ineffective to answer modern conditions. But the
problemof improvement did not seem pressing; the number
of partition suits was not large and Lord Holt could say with
little fear of contradiction, "the law loves not fractions of
estates, nor to divide and multiply tenures".49  The greatest
procedural defect was the lack of power to order a sale, where
a division of the property was distinctly injurious. But, doubt-
less, public opinion of that day, if voiced, would have concurred
in preferring to endure the discomforts of an occasional gro-
tesque division rather than concede to the courts the power to
lay sacreligious hands upon the family acres. Even in an Amer-
ican court it could be urged insistently that "a man cannot be,
compelled to change his investmeni and give up his fee simple
against his will".5" It is needless to add,. however, that the law
was quite incompetent to deal adequately with many settled
I8 Ves. 143 (18o3). On argument Mr. Romilly cited a case at Cocker-
mouth where partition had been made of a house by building up a wall
in the middle. In North v. Guinan, Beatty 342 (1829), the chancellor re-
fused partition of a house held under a lease for a term of years on the
ground that it would be waste as against the landlord. Advowsons were
partioned by ordering presentation by turns. Seymour v. Bennet, 2 Atk. 482
(1742).
"Fisher v. Wigg. i Salk. 391 (1700). But compare Lord Hardwicke in
Hawes v. Hawes, i Wils. i65 (1747). "In this court joint tenancies are not
favored because they are a kind of estates that do not make provision for
posterity."
Arguendo in Pell v. Ball, z Rich. S. C. Eq. 361 (1845).
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estates where complex titles, scattered holdings and heavy encum-
brances called for special powers. Hence ,arose the practice of
making partition by private act of Parliament, a method that
may still be resorted to in case of need.51 So also, under the
inclosure acts, power to make partition among the joint owners
was conferred upon the commissioners, whose powers have since
devolved upon the Board of Agriculture.52 But at last came
the era of law reform and with it the Partition Act of i868 53
by which the court must order a sale on request of the owners
of a moiety in the property unless good reason is shown to the
contrary; and may, in its discretion, order a sale at the request
of any owner, if it appears that it will be beneficial by reason
of the nature of the property, the number or disability of the
parties, or other circumstances." All actions for partition or
sale are assigned to the Chancery Division of the High Court
of Justice, and, generally, partition is made in chambers by
laying proposals before the judge. Indeed, in order to avoid
expense or delay the judge may order proceedings out of court.
55
The appointment of commissioners, which Vice Chancellor
Stuart described as "a remnant of barbarism", 6 although still
possible is never resorted to and is practically obsolete.
In the United States the law of partition is statutory, the
laws of the different states varying so greatly in detail that they
are bewildering to read and unprofitable to remember. Never-
theless, they bear a certain family resemblance due to the fact
that their ultimate source is the English system, either that of
law or equity, a result of colonial experiments before the English
Q2I Halsburys Laws 812 See also Provincial Laws of New Hampshire,
Vol. 3, PP. 33, 76, 373 for special partition acts.
'38 & 9 Vict. c. iiS Foster on Partition 164; 21 Halsbury's Laws 824;
Jacomb v. Turner (x8w2), i Q. B. 49.
" 31 & 32 VCL C. 40.
"Pemberton v. Barnes (i871). 6 Ch. App. 68s; Porter v. Lopes (1877),
7 Ch. D. .. 8: Gilbert v. Smith (r879). zz Ch. D. 78: Saxton v. Bartley, 48
I- J. Ch. 519 (1879); Re Whitwell's Estates, i9 L. R. 1., 45 (i887); Hills v.
Archer, 91 L. T. 166 (19o4).
"4 Rules of Sunreme Court. Order si. rule is.
"Clatke v. Clayton, 6 Jurist (N. S.) 1238 (i86o); 2z Halsburys Laws
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law itself had reached its maturity. Partition is of more im-
portance in this country than in England and the cases more
numerous. Joint adventures in land speculation, popular from
early days, have called for legal assistance in disentangling the
confused titles that were their result. So, also, the universal
adoption of the policy of equal division of the property of a
decedent among his children has contributed to the increase of
such litigation. In the colonies more directly under the influence
of the Crown, New York, New Jersey, Virginia, the Carolinas,
and Georgia, primogeniture prevailed until the Revolution; it was
also the rule for a time in Rhode Island and Maryland.5 7  As
early as 1641- Massachusetts provided for a division of the in-
heritance giving th6 eldest son a double portion in accordance
with the Old Testament law and this principle -was followed in
Connecticut.58 William Penn proposed a similar law to the
provincial assembly held at New Castle in 1684. Whether the
idea was derived from the Massachusetts law or directly from
Deuteronomy does not appear, but the principle of a double por-
tion to the eldest son was adopted Il and retained in the various
revisions of the intestate laws of both Pennsylvania and Dela-.
ware until repealed in both States in I794,60 the Delaware act
containing the significant preamble that it was "the duty-and
policy of every republican government to preserve equality
among its citizens by maintaining the balance of property as fir
as is consistent with the rights of individuals"i A statement
that accords'with thought of the period, as summarized by Chan-
"4 Kent's Commentaries (14 Ed.) 375 note; N. Y. Act of July 12, 1782,
. Rev. Stat. N. Y. (1829) 47.
"Laws of Massachusetts (Ed. 1672), p. 758; Deuteronomy, ch. 21, V.
17: Laws of Colony of New Plymouth.revision of 1671 (Ed. 1836) 2W9. The
rule was abolished in Mass. by Act of June 8, 1789, Laws of Mass. (1807)
464"; in Connecticut in i792, Swift's system of Laws of Conn. Vol. 1. p.
282. In New Brunswick the practice was continued. Revised Stat. New
Brunswick (1854),. part II, tit. 3, ch. in."Charter and Laws of Penna. (Ed. z879) 174. In 1683 an act was passed
disposing of decedent's estates, one-third to the wife, one-third to the chil-
dren, and "the other one-third as he pleases," a curious attempt to revive
an .ancient custom (see 2 Pollock & Maitland Hist. 349), which was aban-
doned as quickly as it was adopted. Charter & Laws of Pa. 141.
" Pa. Act., April 19, 1794, 3 Smith's Laws 143; Act of Jan. 29, 1794, 2
Laws of Delaware (79) 1172.
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cellor Kent, that the common law doctrines of descent were
incompatible with that equality of right and universal participa-
tion in civil privileges which it was the policy of the country to
preserve.6' Primogeniture received its deathblow in the United
States when Jefferson lent the weight of his powerful influ-
ence to procure its abolition in Virginia, then the stronghold of
entails. "Mr. Pendleton", says Jefferson, "wished to preserve
the right of primogeniture, but seeing at once that it could not
prevail, he proposed we should adopt the Hebrew principle, and
give a double portion to the eldest son. I observed that if the
eldest son could eat twice as much, or do double work, it might
be a natural evidence of his right to a double portion; but being
on a par in his powers and wants, with his brothers and sisters,
he should be on a par also in the partition of the patrimony,
and such was the decision of the other. members." 62 The rule
of- division among all the children which American opinion now
accepts as fundamental is no doubt a product of that strong
feeling for equality which the public men of the Revolutionary
period voiced so effectively. But economic conditions had'a part
in strengthening that feeling; the abundance of land, the variety
of opportunity offered by a new and growing country, and not
least, the restless American temperament which ever seeking a
new habitation and never satisfied, regards the unity of the fam-
ily with something like aversion. Only in rare instances is there
displayed that tendency to cling to the homestead which marks
the European. Among emigrants and pioneers, now as ever,
the usual desire is to divide the inheritance and start anew. A
similar antagonism to the unification of land holding is indi-
cated in the attitude toward survivorship in joint tenancies,
repudiated in Plymouth colony as early as 1643 and now gen-
erally restricted to the estates of trustees. 3
"4 Kents Commentaries 383.
:The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Ford's Ed.), Vol r, p. 6o.
"Laws of Colony of New Plymouth (Ed. r836) 75,279; Act of Mar.
x6, 1783-4, r Laws of Mass. (Ed. 18o7), p. x6z, .Sec. 4. In the act of Mar.
9, 1786, Sec. 3 it is said that tenancies in common are "more beneficial to
the Commonwealth and consonant to the genius of republicks:' See also
Jenks v. Backhouse, r Binn. Pa. 9 (1833); z .Washburn on Real Property
(sth Ed.) 677.
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Massachusetts commenced early to -legislate on partition.
An aRct of 1692 conferred upon the judge of probate jurisdiction
to distribute the real and personal property of an intestate among
his children, the division of houses arid lands to be made by five
sufficient freeholders appointed by the judge; provided that
where the lands could not be divided without prejudice to or
spoilin of the whole, the judge might order the whole to the
eldest son, or the other sons successively on his refusal, he pay-
ing owelty to the other children.6 4  In the following year it
was enacted that all co-owners might be compelled to divide by
writ of partition at the common law.65 In 1727 guardians'of
infants were empowered to join in the partition of lands, to be
made by five freeholders appointed by the justices of the Superior
Court. 6  The interesting feature in the legislation of 1692 and
1727 is the departure from the sheriff's jury and the adoption
of the principle of a small committee corresponding to the com-
missioners of the English chancery court. More important was
the innovation made in the act of 1748 which provided that where
any person was interested with others in any lot or grant of
land, the superior court was authorized on application to cause
partition to be made and the share of the party or parties apply-
ing for the same to be set off and divided from the rest; the
partition to be made by five freeholders.6 7 In Dane's Abridg-
ment the learned editor explains the policy of this legislation
as follows: "From very early times we have had many estates
held in conmon of so large tracts of land, and by such numerous
er Prov. Laws (State Ed.) 43; 2 Laws of Mass. (Ed. i8o7) 969, supplied
by the act of Mar. 9, 1783-4, Secs. 4 & 5, r Laws of Mass. (Ed. 18o7) 124.
See also the earlier acts of 1641 and 1649, 3 Prov. Laws. (state Ed.) 426,
Laws of Mass. (Ed. 1672) 18. The act of 1750, 2 Laws of Mass. (Ed. i8o7)
i03o provided for partition where the intestate died without issue. An act
of r752 empowered the probate Judge to make partition between devisees.
ax Prov. Laws (state Ed.) 12; 2 Laws of Mass. (Ed. 1807), supplied
by the act of Mar. 9, 1785-6, ch. 62, Sec. 2, r Laws of Mass. (Ed. i8o7) 296;
O'Brien v. Mahoney, 179 Mass. 2oo (igox). The writ is now abolished, Rev.
Laws Mass. (9o) Ch. 184, Sec. r.
_2 Laws of Mass. (Ed. 187) 1o.
't Prov. Stat: 1748-9, c. 12, 3 Prov. Law (State Ed.J 426, 2 Laws of
Mass. (Ed. 1807) 1040, supplied by the act of Mar. xl, 1783, ch. 41, Rev. Sts. c.
103, x Laws of Mass. (Ed. 18o7) 144. An act of 176o authorized the ap-
pointment of -either three or five freeholders to make the partition.
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owners- that it must have often been utterly impracticable to
have commenced and carried a writ of partition through all its
stages, without the death of some one of the parties happening
pending the suit, and totally impracticable in a single action to
have divided a great tract of land into hundreds or thousands
of parts or shares. Some mode then evidently became neces-
sary to enable some one or more of these owners to have his
or their shares set off from the rest, without making as many
divisiois as owners." 8  An illustration of this type of proceed-
ing will be found in Vaughn v. Noble 69 where the petition was
for the partition of a tract eight miles wide and twenty-five
miles long, comprehending "several townships and parts of town-
ships which contained several thousand inhabitants". This leg-.
islation introduced two distinct novelties into the law of par-
tition." One, in permitting a single co-owner to have his share
set out for him leaving the residue subject to future partition.
The common law action required that each co-owne" should
have his part allotted in severalty 70 and, no doubt, a suit for
partition should embrace the whole tract and all persons inter-
ested should be joined as parties for the protection of their
rights. But, on principle, there is no reason why those who do
not wish to sever should be required to do so because others
desire to hold alone.71 Another feature was the adoption of a
new procedure based on petition more akin in some respects
to proceedings in equity than at law. Massachusetts was at that
time without a court of chancery and the method adopted may
be regarded as one of the consequences of that lacuna in its
system of justice. In later years, it was held that the statutory
proceeding excluded'equity from jurisdiction in partition.72 The
'Dane's Abridgment, Ch. igr, Art. 5. The editor overstates the case in
attributing this method to "most of the English colonies in America."
06 Mass. 252 (i8io). See also Mitchell v. Starbuck, To Mass. 5 (1813).
" Hanson v. Willard, 12 Me. 142 ('835); Sweeney v. Meany, x Miles
Pa. 167 (1836); Sutter v. San Francisco, 36 Cal. 112 (868).
"McWhorter v. Gibson, 2 Wend, N. Y. 43 (i829) ;'Abbott v. Berry,
46 N. H. 369 (1866); Battle v. John, 49 Tex. 20 (1878).
"Husband v. Aldrich, 135 Mass. 317 (1883). Prior to 1870 there was
no power in Massachusetts to order a sale, Ramsey v. Humphrey, 162 Mass.
385 (184).
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practice spread to other colonies and is the probable source of,
or at least furnished the suggestion for, the summary and con-
venient remedy by petition without writ found in the laws of
many states.7 2
In Gallatian v. Cunningham 74 it is said by the court that
English law continued to be the law of New York as regards
partition until 1785 when-the first act on that subject was passed.
This is not quite accurate. As early as I762 an act was passed
"for the more effectual collection of his Majesty's quit-rents
in the colony of New York and for partition of lands in- order
thereto". The act after referring to the difficulties growing out
of grants of large tracts, some of which had been subdivided
informally while others could not be divided, as the law now
is, by reason of absence, infancy, or coverture of some of the
proprietors and the great number of shares, goes on to provide
for the partition, by three commissioners, appointed by the par-
ties, or by one of the judges of the supreme court in case of
dispute,who were to cause a'survey to be made of the land, which
was to be divided by lot. The act was to continue in force
until i77o but was in 1768 continued until 178o.75 The act
of March 16, 1785, is practically a re-enactment of the earlier
act in more extended form, with some additions, the most mi-
portant of which is the provision of a more easy and less
expensive procedure for the *division of small estates in the
county court of common pleas' which authorized the sale of
the property where a division could not be made without preju-
dice to the owners.76  After that partition statutes came thick
and fast explainir.g and modifying the prior legislation and indi-
cating that the practice was still unsettled. One may. suspect
" For example. New Hampshire. Act of 1766. Laws Prov. Period. Vol.
3, p. 396; New Hampshire Pub. Stat. Ch. 243, Sec. 2; Maine Rev. Stat.
Ch. 93, Sec. 2; Vermont Gen. Stat. (1917), Sec. 2156; New Jersey Comp.
Stat. Vol. 3, P. 3897; Illinois Ann. Stat, Val. 4, Sec. 8314; Ohio Bates' Ann.
Stat. Vol. 2. Sm 5766; Missouri Ann. Stat., Sec. 4373.
"8 Cowen. N.* Y. 361 0836).
"Act of Jan. 8, 1762, Rev. Stat. N. Y. (Ed. 1829), Appendix, pp. ir, 19.
"Rev. Stat. N. Y. (Ed. i189), Appendix, p. 61. See further this appendix
for a collection of various partition acts prior to the adoption of the Revised
Statutes in 1827-.
PARTITION
that the curse of over-elaboration had already fallen upon New
York procedure. One act, that of February 6, 1788, is a re-
enactment of the English act of 8 & 9 William III ch. 31, indi-
cating that the common lawyer was still holding his own;
another, that of April 7, i8oi, provided more explicitly for the
commencement of proceedings by petition; another, that of
April 12, 1813, authorized the court of chancery to direct a sale
in partition where the ends of justice required it, indicating that
the concurrent jurisdiction of that court was fully recognized.
The acts were brought together and clarified in a title of the
Revised Statutes of 1827 7' which made the petition the basis
of proceedings at law, with concurrent. jurisdiction in equity.
This legislation is substantially the basis of the present practice
as found in the code of civil procedures although petition and
bill have both yielded to the statutory summons and complaint.
The proceedings may lead either to a physical division of fie
property by commissioners,-three reputable freeholders, as of
old,---or to a sale by a referee or the sheriff under the direction
of the court.
In Pennsylvania, as in Massachusetts, the earliest legislation
on partition is connected with the- settlement of decedents'
estates. An act passed in 1693, while Governor Fletcher of
New York was in charge of the province and confirmed upon
the restoration of Penn's government, provided for the allot-
ment and distribution of the property of decedents among their
heirs by the register general."' The substance of this law as
embodied in the .ct of November 27, i7oo, which was refused
confirmation by the Queen in Council, on the advice of the attor-
ney general because it made real estate distributable in the same
manner as personalty and differed from the English rules of
inheritance. 80 A new act was passed in i7o5 conferring upon
"Rev. Stat. N. Y. (Ed. I82) Chap. 5, tit. 3, P. 317.
" N. Y. Code Civ. Pro., Secs. 1532-1595; Matter of Cavanagh, 37 Barb.
22 (r862): Crogan & Livingston, 6 Abb. Pr. 350 (.Y858); Myers v. Rasback,
4: How. Pr. 83 (x849).
"Charter and Laws of Penna. (Ed. 1879), 231, confirmed by the act- of
May io, 1696, id. 264.
M2 "Stat. at Large Penna., pp. 31, 449, 492. The attorney general's crfti-
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the orphans' court jurisdiction to distribute the estates of per-
sons dying intestate and providing that lands not sola to pay
debts should be divided between the intestate's widow and chil-
dren who were to "make partition as tenants in common may
or can do".8' Did this mean by action at law or by proceedings
the orphans' court? The language was ambiguous, but the
doubt was set at rest by the act of 1748-49 which authorized
the orphans' court, on petition, to appoint four persons chosen
by the parties to make partition, or, where the parties could.
not agree, to award an inquest. To this there was a proviso
clearly derived from the Massachusetts act of 1692-the lan-
guage is almost the same-which enacts that lands which cannot
be divided without prejudice to or spoiling of the whole shall
be awarded to the eldest son, or to the other sons successively,
on paying proportionable parts of the value to the other chil-
dren.8 2  In the acts that succeeded anendments and additions
did not change substantially the character of the proceedings
which are still open to those interested in the land of a decedent
whether testate or intestate and whether or not sole seised.83 The
act of 1794 increased the number of commissioners to seven, now
reduced- to three. The act of April 2, i8o4, authorized a sale
of land where it could not be divided and the heirs refused to
take at the appraisement, a provision that had been adopted five
years earlier in actions a Iaw.8'
cidm was so effective that the distinction .between the descent of real and
personal property was preserved until the act of June 7, r917, P. L 429,
Sec. x, passed on the recommendation of the commission to cqdify the law of
decedents' estates.
'June 12, 17o5, 2 Stat. at Large Penna. xg9. The widows' interest was
by the act of 1748-49, construed to be a life interest only. The act of 1705
was repealed by the act of x794 infra.
"Feb. 4, 1748-49, s Stat.'at Large Penna. 62. The act of 1764 gave the
daughters also the right to accept at the appraisement. The act of i9xy
awards the property first to the surviving spouse and second to the other
parties in the order of seniority in age.
"See the Orphans' Court Partition act of 1917, P. L. 337 and the re-
port of the Commission to codify the law of decedents' estates. See alsci
the intestate acts of Mar. z3, 1764, 6 Stat. at Large, Pa. 339; April 19, 1794,
3 Smith's Laws, Pa. r43; Mar. 29, 1832, P. L. i9o, Sec. 36. The Court of
Common Pleas has concurrent jurisdiction, act of April 21, 1846, P. L.
426, Sec. x.
a 4 Smith's Laws, Pa. 183--Compare the act of April i, 1799, . Smith's
Laws 6, SOc. 2.
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The action of partition may be regarded as part of the com-
mon law of the state, for the two statutes of Henry VIII were
reported by the judges as in force in Pennsylvania."5 The act of
8 & 9 William III was not in force, since it was passed after the
settlement and never extended to the province in practice. 86 In
the act of 17io-I1 establishing courts of judicature it was pro-
vided that writs of partition might be brought and proceeded
on in the courts of common pleas according to the course in
Great Britain and as the statute of 8 & 9 William III directed;
but the act, lengthv and intricate, was repealed by the Queen
in Council, and its successor the act of 1722 merely conferred
upon the justices in general words the power to grant writs of
partition. 7 The first important statute dealing with, partition
at law is the act of -799 which after conferring jurisdiction on
the supreme court, which still went on circuit as .well as the
common pleas, went on to provide that if the estate could not be
divided without prejudice to or spoiling the whole, the inquest
should return its value and the court should adjudge the whole
to one of the parties at the appraised value on securing the others
their respective shares, aid if none of the parties would take
at the appraisement, the court might order a sale at public
auction by the sheriff. 8 Part of this procedure was, no doubt,
borrowed from the long established practice of the orphans'
court although the method of allotment was different. In the
orphans' court the right of election was reminiscent of the course
of descent at comm6n law, inapplicable to co-tenancies by pur-
chase; hence in the common pleas the court decided to whom
the land should be conveyed.80 The provision for a sale in case
"Roberts' Digest of English Statutes in Force in Penna., p. 226; Duke v.
Hague, io7 Pa. 7" (I884).
M'Kee v. Straub, 2 Binn. Pa. z (ixo9).
"Feb. 28th, 171o-ir, Sec. 24, 2 Stat at -Large Pa. 30T, 548; May 22, 1722,
Sec. io. i Stat, at Large Pa. 2g&
mAct of April ir, '09, 3 Smith's Laws Pa. 386, 3 Pepper & Lewis
Dig. (2 Ed.) 556o.
u Clawges v. Clawgei, 2 Miles Pa. 34 (1836). An act of May s; 1841,
P.1L. 35o, directed that the co-tenants should elect "according to the dates
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of refusal to take at the appraisement was new and may have been
suggested by the then recent legislation in New York; it is sig-
nificant that a section of the act of 1799, soon after repealed, pro-
vided a summary method by petition for the sale of unseated
and unimproved tracts.90 It is unnecessary to refer to the subse-
quent amendments to this legislation; the number of the inquest
has been reduced to six, or the parties may agree on three or
more commissioners; 91 but the scope of the proceedings has
changed little. In 1845 equity jurisdiction in partition was con-
ferred on the courts of Philadelphia which by subsequent legis-
lation was extended throughout the state 92 and the present ten-
dencyin practice is to proceed by bill in equity rather than by
action at law.
To trace further the history of early American statutes on
partition would unduly prolong a discussion that has already
extended too far into details. The experience of each colony
was different and the exact extent of their respective borrowings
difficult to estimate.92 The three provinces selected will serve
to illustrate the striving to obtain an equable system where the
law and practice of the mother country was of little help but
still dominated the legislative mind. The early session laws of
the original states show great activity -in real property legisla-
tion during the generation that succeeded the Revolution, in
which partition had its share but like other subjects was ad-
versely affected by the careless drafting of the laws and their
frequent amendment. Later revisions of the statutes have re-
of their respective titles legal or equitable. Dana v. Jackson, 6 Pa. 234
(1847).
"Section 3 of the act of 1799, repealed by the act of Mar. 28, i806,
4 Sm. L. 335. Sec. 2.
"Acts of May z, 1879, P. L. 4o; April 27, 1853, P. L. 368, Sec. 4,
"Acts of March 17, 1845, P. L x58, Sec. 3; Feb. 14, 1857, P. L. 39; July
7, i88, P. L 257; Sheridan v. Sheridan, 136 Pa. T4 (r89o).
"See Laws of New Hampshire (Prov. Period) 9, act of Sept. 27, x745;
Vol. 3 id. 396, Act of July 3, 1766. Connecticut Laws (Ed. i&oQ), p. 437;
Rhode Island Laws (Ed. 1798) 269; Maryland Act of 1785 ch. 72, Sec. 12;
Virginia Act of 1786, ch. 6o, 12 Hebings Laws 349; New Jersey Acts of
Nov. 11, 1789, and Mar. 9, 1707; Stevens v. Enders, r3 N. J. L. 271 (1833);
Watson v. Kelty, x6 N. J. L 5t7, Rev. L. N. J. (1847) ioz; Brevards Dig.
S. Car. Vol. ur. P. i02. acts of r748 and 1791.
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duced this material to something like ordei but no general system
is recognized. In a few jurisdictions the common law writ is
still in use,-more frequently the proceedings are commenced
by petition or complaint. In many states the courts charged
with the settlement of decedent's estates have jurisdiction in par-
tition more or less extensive. In some states courts of law and
equity exercise con current jurisdiction.
Owing to the absence of law reports in the colonial period
the early history of partition by courts of chancery is obscure,
as is also the case in other branches of equity jurisprudence..
In the early days political opposition to the exercise of the
office of chancellor by the provincial governor led to the aban-
donment of separate courts of chancery in some colonies, while
in others where they continued to exist the amount of business
transacted was not.large; the simplicity of colonial life and the
disinclination of the settlers to seek the aid of a distant court
retarded the growth of equity which was still burdened with a
tedious and costly procedure.94 A search of the various state
archives would, no doubt, yield some cases but the result would
hardly warrant the labor;J he reorganization of the courts that
attended the Revolution broke the continuity, of precedent and
relegated the earlier records to the domain of the antiquary.
The registrar's book of the short lived court of chancery 'estab-
lished in Pennsylvania by Governor Sir William Keith shows
one case of partition in which one of the defendants proved
most obstinate. He would not appear to the subpoena, was at-
tached and remained in jail from June, I733, -to November,
1734, when the complainants obtained a decree pro confesso.
An order for partition by three commissioners was then made
and served on the obstinate one who returned that "he did not
care". A writ was issued but nothing further is reported. The
prospect of obtaining a conveyance from such a defendant. must
have been smallA9 Among the Virginia reports of Sir John
"Courts of Chancery in the American Colonies, Wilson, z8 Amer. L.
Rev. =6 0884).
"Rawle's Equity in Pennsylvnia 8, app. 34; i Pa. Archives 442.
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Randolph there is a suit in chancery for partition in i73o, the
reporter representing the plaintiffs. The title was complicated,
involving questions of joint tenancy and survivorship. Some
of Randolph's contentions were not sustained by the court. The
next morning, he goes on to say, counsel inet in the secretary's
office to direct the clerk in drawing the de~ree. The defend-
ants solicitors gave the clerk instructions more favorable to the
plaintiff than the opinion of the court warranted; but, adds
Randolph, "the decree was drawn and being for my client's
advantage I did not gainsay it".96 A Virginia act of I786 pro-
vided for partition by writ in the manner of the statute of
8 & 9 William III, yet so few were the instances of its use and
so completely had proceedings in equity for partition superseded
those at law that in 1825 one of the judges of the court of
appeals doubted whether a writ of partition had ever been pros-
ecuted in Virginia.97 "In this", says Professor Minor, "he seems
to have been mistaken. At all events, an application to equity
for partition is not now, and for more than a century has not
been, an application merely to the sound judicial discretion of
the court, as in cases of specific performance,- but independently
of the statutory provisions, it is due ex debito justitiae".98 As
soon as law reports appear cases on partition in equity are
found in various jurisdicions. In some states the cumulative
remedy by bill in equity 'is reaffirmed or conceded by statute,
in others concurrent authority is asserted as part of the ancient
jurisdiction of the court, based on its superior ability to do com-
plete justice. To the -wide extent of the latter view the strong
influence of Mr. Justice Story contributed. In many instances
"Thorton v. Buckner, Virginia Colonial Decisions (Ed. 1969), VoL z,
X. 30.
"Wisley v. Findlay, 3 'Rand. Va. 36z (x825), cf. act of 1786, ch. 6o, 1a
Henings Laws 349.
2 Minor's Institutes (3 Ed.) 478; .Straughan v. Wright, 4 Rand. Va.
493 (1826). By itatute a court of equity may take cognizance of questions
of law affecting legal title. Davis v. Tabbs, 81 Va. 6oo (z886). In Georgia,
on the other hand, equity would not assume jurisdiction in partition unless
the relief at law was inadequate. Boggs v. Chambers, 9 Ga. i (x85o) ; Ruther-
ford v. Jones, 14 Ga. 52 (1854).
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the leading case of a state rests its judgment on the text of his
equity jurisprudence09
American courts have extended the limits of this branch of
equity by including personal property within its scope. Par-
tition proceedings for the division of -chattels were unknown
at common law or in equity,100 although familiar to continental
jurisprudence. The assumption of this power, now enlarged
by statutes and judicial decisions, is obscure, but would seem
to have first occurred- in the Southern, colonies in connection.
with the division of slaves, which in some instances were made
real estate by statute for the purpose of descent and distribution
but in all other respects were regarded as personal property. 0 1
In Virginia as early as 1705, slaves were made partible, and by
an act of 1727 any person having the right to partition of any
slave or slaves. was authorized to bring a bill in equity for that
purpose. 0 2 In the frequently cited case of Smith v. Smith 103
the property involved consisted of slaves and the object of the
bill was to obtain specific performance of an award of arbitra-
tors making partition. The court held that it could carry the
award into effect by decreeing an allotment of the slaves or, if
that could not be done, their sale. The early statutes of the
"Dinckle v. Timrod. i Dess. S. C. Eq. log (1784); Wilkin & Wilkino i
Johns. Ch. N. Y. ii (1814); Larkin v. Mann, 2 Paige Ch. N. Y. 27. (i83o);
Hewitt's Case, 3 Bland Md. 84 (183j); Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, 2 N. J.
Eq. 349 (84o); Thayer v. Lane, Har. Mich. 247 (184); Railey v. Railey,
5 B. Mon. Ky. iior (1844); Irwin v. King, 28 N. Car. 219 (r845); Bailey v.
Sisson, r R. 1. 233 (1849) ; Donnell v. Mateer, 42 N. Car. 94 (i85o); Howey
v. Goings, 13 Ill. 95 (i8sx); Spitts v. Wells, 18 Mo. 468 (z853); Patton v.
Wagner, ig Ark. 233 (1857); Whitten v. Whitten, 36 N. H. 326 (1858);
Hopper v. Fisher, 2 Head Tenn. 253 (1858); Paddock v. Shields, 57 Miss.
340 (1871) ; Bradford v. Robinson, 7 Hust. Del. 29 (1884); Nash v. Simp-
son, 78 Me. 142 (1886); Donnor v. Quartermas, 90 Ala. 164 (1889); Hale v.
Jaques, 69 N. H. 411 (r898).
'" Gudgell v. Mead, 8 Mo. 53 (843); 6 Pomeroy's Equity Jur. (3d Ed.),
Sec. 705; Halsbury's Laws, Vol. 21, p. 836. Mr. Freeman, in his work on
cotenancy, states in Sec. 426 that jurisdiction was exercised by the Court of
Chancery in England for the partition of chattels but gives no authority.
2aVirginia Colonial Decisions (Ed. i9o9), Vol. r, R. 82, Vol. 2, B. 372;
Walden V. Payne,. 2 Wash. Va. 1 (1794); Floyd v. Breckenridge, 4 Bibb,
Ky., 14 (185) ; Gullett v. Lamberton, 6 Ark. i09 (1845).
'"Coleman v. Hutchenson, 3 Bibb, Ky. 2o9 (183); Virginia Act of-1727
Ch. ir. Sec. 18. 4 Hening's Laws 227.
'"4 Randolph. Va. 95 O826).
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state were not referred to but a court of equity was declared
to be the proper tribunal for the partition of personal property.
In Pell v. Ball 104 in the court of chancery of South Carolina,
the bill was to divide "land and negroes". In affirming a decree
ordering a sale, Chancellor Harper said: "Undoubtedly our
courts of chancery have assumed jurisdiction in various in-
stances not warranted by the rules and practices of the high
court of chancery of South Britain, to which by act of assembly
of 1721 they are directed to conform. . It exercised,
also, juirisdiction in making partition of slaves, for which, of
course, it could derive no authority from English law. It is
not questioned, but that the jurisdiction has been exercised famil-
iarly and habitually for the greater portion of a century." From
slaves the jurisdiction was extended to chattels generally;l0
and, as the assumption of such power was eminently reasonable
and practical, there being no remedy at law whatsoever, the doc-
trine soon spread, and, except in a few instances,108 is generally
recognized throughout .the country.0 7  .
In another respect American law as found in the statutes,
or as those statutes have been interpreted, differs from that of
England. There, as has been'.ihown, the owners of a moiety
of the property are usually entitled to a sale as a matter of
right, owners of less than a moiety may obtain a sale but must
show cause. In the United States it is generally laid down that,
as between a sale and a physical division the courts will favor
the latter.108  The explanation of this is that in England statu-
r" Rich. S. Car. Eq. 16i (84s).
'"Kerley v Clay. 4 Bibb. Ky. 241 (8x1) : Crapster v. Griffith. 2 Bland
Md. 25 (-829); Irwin v. Kind. 28 N. Car. 2wx (184.): Steedman v. Weeks
2 Strob. S. Car. Eq. r45 (1848) ; Smith v. Dunn, 27 Ala. 315 (1855); Porter
v. Stone, 7o Miss. 29x (1892); Neal v. Suber, 56 S. Car. 298 (i899).
"Gudgell v. Mead, 8 Mo. 53 (1843), otherwise now by statutes, Cald-
well v. Wright, 88 Mo. App. 604 (igoi); Rice v. Freeland, 66 Mass. 17o
('1853); Simmonds Mfg. Co. v. P6wer, 49 Pittsburg, L. J. 435 (r902).
2rTinney v. Stebbins, 28 Barb. N. Y. -9o (8W8); Low v. Holmes, 17
N. J. Eq. x48 (1864) ; Conover v. Earl, 26 Ia. 167 (i68) ; Andrews v. Betts,
8 Hun. N. Y. 322 (876): Swain v. Knavp. 12 Minn. 429 (884); Godfrey
v. White, 6o Mich. 443 (l&6); Spaulding v. Warner, sg Vt. 646 (1887);
Robinson v. Dickey, 143 Ind. 2o5 (i8gs); Eisner v. Curiel, 2o N. Y. Misc.
245 ( aSh).'" Davis v. Davis, 37 N. Car. 6o7 (j843) ; Smith -v. Smith, io Paige, N.
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tory authority to sell came late; at a time when the sympathy
previously felt for the co-owner who clung desperately to the
inherited land had changed to an equally strong sympathy for
those who desired to free their capital from what to them was an
unsatisfactory investment. The early American statutes permit-
ting a sale when great prejudice would result from a division
were passed at a time when interests were mainly agricultural
and neither legislator nor judge would willingly disturb the tra-
ditional attitude toward ownership. Legal opinion on this ques-
tion has moved more slowly than that of property owners.
Seventy-five years ago it was shrewdly remarked in'argument
in the South Carolina case already quoted: "It seldom hap-
pens that men will insist on a specific partition of. land, as
most people are glad, in the abundance of land, to get the pro-
ceeds of sale and purchase for themselves." Observation indi-
cates today a great reluctance on the part of co-owners to accept
the opinion of the commissioners or other officer charged with
the valuation of the property and a general desire to test the
value by a public sale. An obstinate litigant may occasionally
invoke the old rule, but in uncontested cases, all parties are
usually anxious for a sale at auction where they can bid what
they think the property is worth or let it go to anyone who
thinks it worth more. 7
A survey of partition at law and in equity leaves on the
mind an impression not unlike the feeling aroused by observing
an aged man in an executive position, admiration for the vet-
eran's toughness and despair at his pottering methods. Parti-
tion is ancient-many titles in the law are parvenus by compar-
ison. For hundreds of years judges have pronounced divisions
"firm and stable", the magic formula that secures the title to the
allotments. To read the record of a partition suit-is to read
back through the ages, through the days of the eighteenth cen-
tury chancellors, Coke, Littleton, and beyond. Marvelous is the
Y. 470 (843) ; Richardson *v. Mouson, 23 Conn. 94 (i8S4); Earle v.. Turton,
26 Md. 23 (1866) ; Davidson v. Thompson, 2,2 N. J. Eq. 83 (187); Johnson.
v. Olmsted, 49 Conn. 5o9 (882); Royston v. Miller, 76 Fed. 5o (1896);
Kennedy v. Condran, 244 Pa. -64 (914). See Frost v. Frost, 25 Pa. D. .R.
487, for an effort to take a short cut in partition rebuked.
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continuity of legal forms. Partition would also be modem,
greatly encompassed by. statutes, as our aged man is presumably
wrapped in flannels. Brevity, clarity and consistency in these
statutes is seldom sought and still less frequently achieved; in
deed there are sometimes several statutory methods of partition
differing in unimportant details in a single state. This furthers
litigation; most partition cases that get into the reports turn on
questions of practice merely. No doubt rost of these statutes
were passed with the benevolent object of protecting the rights
of the parties, but an elaborate and technical procedure defeats
its own purpose by laying traps for the unwary and preventing
those special arrangements that may, under the circumstances,
be highly, advantageous co all concerned. Once the court has
determined the interests of the parties by its preliminary judg-
ment, there is less danger in permitting a certain amount of
flexibility in the subsequent proceedings, subject of course to the
court's supervision, than in consigning all cases to the same pro-
crustean treatment. It may be said that if the parties are in.
agreement it is unlikely they will seek a court for partition.
That, in a sense, is true; no co-owners who can make an amicable
partition will seek the aid of the court and subject themselves
to costs and fees that are too frequently out of proportion to
the services rendered. Only the unfortunate are brought into
these proceedings by conflicting claims, heavy encumbrances, per-
sonal disability, perhaps bad advice. But if partition proceed-
ings were simple, cheap and expeditiotis, wouid not suitors be
attracted by a title decreed by a court, to the profit of the
legal profession? There was a time, now remote, when the
king's court was sought because better and speedier justice could
be obtained there than outside. It is conceivable that such a
period might recur.
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